This unique textbook--the first to offer balanced, comprehensive coverage of all major perspectives on the rational justification of religious belief--includes twenty-four key papers by some of the world's leading philosophers of religion. Arranged in six sections, each representing a major approach to religious epistemology, the book begins with papers by noted atheists, setting the stage for the main theistic responses--Wittgensteinian Fideism, Reformed epistemology, natural theology, prudential accounts of religious beliefs, and rational belief based in religious experience--in each case offering a (...) representative sample of papers by leading exponents, a critical paper, and a substantial bibliography. A comprehensive introductory essay and ample cross-references help students to contrast and evaluate the different approaches, while the overall arrangement encourages them to assess the full range of philosophical positions on the issue. Carefully selected to provide both a comprehensive overview of current work and a series of modern perspectives on many classic sources--Swinburne's detailed discussion of Hume's critique of the design argument, for example, as well as an entire section evaluating and extending Pascal's famous Wager--the essays also provide a uniquely readable survey that will be useful in a wide range of undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of religion and epistemology. (shrink)

Exploiting the resources of phenomenal conservatism, Harold Netland has offered a “critical-trust” approach to assessing the veridicality of religious experience and to ascertaining its evidential force in relation to Christian theistic belief. I suggest that, if we give seemings carried in religious experience their epistemic due, it may turn out that religious experience is practically universal and that the potential defeat of justification for religious belief by disagreement among purported epistemic peers is itself defeated by the private character of seemings (...) in the religious experiences of believers. (shrink)

How to reconcile the existence of evil with the belief in a benevolent God has long posed a philosophical problem to the system of Christian theism. This work redress this difficulty in modern terms.

There is an irony about this that can only be appreciated by considering carefully Greco’s epistemological method. With alacrity and equanimity, Greco denies the efficacy of skeptical arguments as arguments that the conditions required for empirical knowledge are not fulfilled. His confidence in this matter is not the result of an elaborate anti-skeptical argument. Rather, it is born of an awareness that there are clear cases of empirical knowledge. This I find refreshing. The shortest route to denying the generalization embodied (...) in knowledge-skepticism is producing counterexamples to the generalization by identifying bona fide cases of empirical knowledge. This is embarrassingly easy to do. G. E. Moore exhibited a special talent for this when he held up his two hands and laconically remarked, “Here is one hand, and here is another.”. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to cast light upon the moral vision—the vision of what is good and what is obligatory —that governs many if not most of the motion pictures produced in the United States in recent years. I especially have in mind productions such as Pleasantville, Cider House Rules , and American Beauty , and will give special attention to these three movies in what follows. But the phenomenon in question extends far beyond these cases. The basic (...) idea governing these films is now a wide-spread and deep-lying conviction in the contemporary American soul. It is that moral rules and rigorous moral order in life, as traditionally understood, are meaningless or pointless at best, and really are repressive of the best aspects of human relationships, individuality and creativity . What would have traditionally been thought of as moral propriety and human goodness is now generally thought of as arbitrary and as harmful to life, if not downright vicious (at least in its effects), largely because they eliminate or repress feelings , the true elixir of life. (shrink)

In his critical commentary on my earlier essay, "The Evidential Value of Miracles," Evan Fales explores a series of general methodological issues in sympathy with David Hume and sets forth three arguments against the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, which it was not the purpose of my essay to defend but which I nevertheless affirmed. In response, I first address each of Fales’s critical asides and interpretive comments, and then respond to his claim that there are three independently (...) decisive arguments against the historicity of the resurrection. Our exchange is part of a larger book symposium on miracles. (shrink)

There is an irony about this that can only be appreciated by considering carefully Greco’s epistemological method. With alacrity and equanimity, Greco denies the efficacy of skeptical arguments as arguments that the conditions required for empirical knowledge are not fulfilled. His confidence in this matter is not the result of an elaborate anti-skeptical argument. Rather, it is born of an awareness that there are clear cases of empirical knowledge. This I find refreshing. The shortest route to denying the generalization embodied (...) in knowledge-skepticism is producing counterexamples to the generalization by identifying bona fide cases of empirical knowledge. This is embarrassingly easy to do. G. E. Moore exhibited a special talent for this when he held up his two hands and laconically remarked, “Here is one hand, and here is another.”. (shrink)